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Fennell: State v. Higgenbottom: Must a Criminal Defendant Endure the Wrath

MUST A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT ENDuRE THE WRATH OF A

STATE

. HIGGENBOTTOM:

VINDICTIVE JUDGE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine your client is serving time in state prison system for a burglary
conviction. Your client requests that you appeal the alleged violation of his
constitutional rights that occurred during the initial trial. What should you
do? In light of a recent South Carolina Court of Appeals decision, one risk
of an appeal is the possibility of a greater sentence if the appeal results in
resentencing.'
In State v. Higgenbottom, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed
an appeal by a criminal defendant asserting that his constitutional rights were
violated when he received a higher sentence in response to a motion for
reconsideration of the sentence.2 The court of appeals affirmed the extended
sentence. 3 Judge Anderson first held that the "rule of futility" excused
Higgenbottom's failure to preserve the issue for appeal.' On the issue of
vindictiveness, Judge Anderson held that there is no reasonable likelihood of
vindictiveness when a trial judge is reconsidering a defendant's sentence at the
defendant's request, thus the presumption of vindictiveness from the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in North Carolinav. Pearce5 does not apply.6
Judge Anderson then concluded that the trial judge's extension of
Higgenbottom's sentence was based on a review of the facts of the case;
therefore, there was no actual vindictiveness on the part of the trial judge
Many jurisdictions have considered whether a higher sentence imposed
upon a defendant who exercises constitutional or statutory rights to appeal or
makes post-trial motions constitutes vindictiveness. The conduct of judges, as
well as prosecutors, has been examined in many jurisdictions using the Pearce
presumption of vindictiveness. The result in Higgenbottom indicates that it is

1. The author acknowledges there is always a risk involved in appealing a criminal
conviction. However, there is a distinction between risks that are constitutionallypermissible and

those that are not. See infra Part llI.C., III.D.
2. State v. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. 637, 525 S.E.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1999), reh g denied.
Although Higgenbottom's extended sentence was upheld, the decision was written by only one
judge, Judge Anderson. Judge Goolsby concurred in the result only, and Judge Connor dissented.
3. Id. at 650, 525 S.E.2d at 256.
4. Id. at 640, 525 S.E.2d at 251.
5. 395 U.S. 711 (1969); see infra Part IHL.B.-D.
6. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 650, 525 S.E.2d at 256.
7. Id.
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becoming increasingly difficult for a defendant in South Carolina to convince
a court that the presumption ofvindictiveness should apply or, in the event that
the presumption does not apply, to prove actual vindictiveness.
This Note examines the constitutionality of allowing a higher sentence on
resentencing in circumstances where no basis for increasing the sentence arises.
Part II discusses the facts and circumstances of the Higgenbottom case,
including the following issues that were raised: (1)did Higgenbottom's failure
to object to the harsher sentence in the trial court bar him from raising this issue
on appeal; (2) should the presumption of vindictiveness apply; and (3) was
there actual vindictiveness leading to the higher sentence? Part III examines the
case law of various jurisdictions involving the constitutionality of increased
sentences after a defendant's appeal or collateral attack on the conviction, and
Part IV compares the holding in Higgenbottom to these cases. This Note
concludes that the South Carolina Court of Appeals' decision inHiggenbottom
is an unwise erosion of the Pearcepresumption.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF STATE v. HGGENBO7TOM

Higgenbottom was arrested for disorderly conduct.8 While being booked,
Higgenbottom pulled a spoon out of his pocket and stated that he "'might as
well get one last piece of it."' 9 The residue on the spoon tested positive for
cocaine.' 0 Higgenbottom claimed the spoon was not his." He insisted that he
found it while cleaning the parking lot at his tire store and placed it in his
pocket when a customer pulled into the parking lot.' 2 At his trial
"Higgenbottom entered anAlfordplea 3 to one count ofpossession of cocaine,
first offense."' 4 He was sentenced to "two years imprisonment and a $5,000
fine, suspended upon the service of thirty days or payment of $750, and
eighteen months probation."'" Before the court sentenced Higgenbottom, his
attorney asked the court to use its discretion and give Higgenbottom a lenient
sentence due to his medical disabilities. 6 The day after Higgenbottom was
sentenced, his counsel made a motion to reconsider the probation portion of his
sentence.'7 The following exchange took place between defense counsel and
the trial judge:

8. Id. at 639, 525 S.E.2d at 250.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 639, 525 S.E.2d at 250-51.
12. Id.
13. When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, but at the same time maintains that he
is not guilty, this is called an Alford plea, after the case which recognized its validity. North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
14. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 639, 525 S.E.2d at 250.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 649, 525 S.E.2d at 256.
17. Id. at 639-40, 525 S.E.2d at 251.
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[Counsel]: Your honor, Ihave one briefmatter; It's a motion
to reconsider on Jeffrey Higgenbottom ....At his request I
am waiving his presence and asking for the court to ...
reconsider the probationary sentence specifically and reduce
that to twelve months.
Court: [Counsel], Mr. Higgenbottom is lucky. Maybe I ought
to reconsider his sentence completely.
[Counsel]: I discussed that with him before I came.
Court: It takes a lot of courage for a lawyer to come back to
ask for a reconsideration like that. Since this term ofcourt has
not expired and since he is asking for a reconsideration
maybe I ought to just reconsider it on my own and extend his
sentence.., have hi[m] picked up to do jail time.
[Counsel]: I understand that, your Honor. I discussed it with
him before he asked for this.
Court: Hejust about talked himself into jail as it was. No, sir;
I'm going to give him twenty-four months probation. We're
going to see if he can do probation. Maybe he'll be cleaning
up his lot again. Since you made the motion to reconsider,
I'm denying that motion and I'm reconsidering my sentence
and extending his probation to twenty-four months."8
On appeal Higgenbottom asserted that the trial court had violated his due
process rights by imposing a longer sentence only because he chose to exercise
his right to bring a post-trial motion.' 9 Before turning its attention to the merit
ofHiggenbottom's claim, Judge Anderson addressed the State's argument that
Higgenbottom failed to preserve the issue for appeal because he did not object
to the extended sentence at the time it was imposed.2" It is well-established in
South Carolina that an objection to sentencing must be raised at trial or the
issue will not be preserved for appellate review.2' Judge Anderson explained
that the court extended Higgenbottom's sentence on amotionto reconsider and
if he had objected at that point, "surely he would [have] place[d] himself in a
perilous posture."' Therefore, Judge Anderson concluded, under "the rule of
futility," that Higgenbottom's failure to object below did notprevent him from
raising the issue on appeal.2

18. Id. at 651, 525 S.E.2d at 257 (Goolsby, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 639, 525 S.E.2d at 251.
20. Id. at 640, 525 S.E.2d at 251.
21. See State v. Johnston, 333 S.C. 459,462,510 S.E.2d 423,425 (1999); State v. Garner,
304 S.C. 220,222,403 S.E.2d 631, 632 (1991); State v. Shumate, 276 S.C. 46,47,275 S.E.2d
288, 288 (1981); State v. Winestock, 271 S.C. 473, 475, 248 S.E.2d 307, 308 (1978).
22. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 640, 525 S.E.2d at 251.
23. Id. Judge Goolsby took the opposite position, affirming the greater sentence because
Higgenbottom did not raise the issue in the court below. Id. at 650-51, 525 S.E.2d at 256-57
(Goolsby, J.,concurring). Judge Goolsby expressly rejected the rule of futility because
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On the issue of vindictiveness, Judge Anderson held that without
reasonable likelihood ofvindictiveness, no presumption of vindictiveness exists
when a defendant makes a motion to reconsider the sentence imposed and, in
response to the motion, the trial judge increases the sentence.24 Thus, when
reasonable likelihood does not exist, the defendant must prove that actual
vindictiveness on the part of the judge led to the increased sentence.' Judge
Anderson found that such "fact-based reconsideration does not rise to the level
of 'actual vindictiveness' on the part of the sentencing judge. 26
A notable aspect of the three opinions in Higgenbottom is the absence of
any reference to the South Carolina Constitution. Article I, section 3 establishes
that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."27 Judge Anderson's opinion implicitly refers to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contained in the United States
Constitution byreferringto priorresentencing cases that were decided on that
basis.29 Judge Goolsby's concurring opinion 0 and Judge Connor's dissenting
opinioni 3' both mention due process in passing. The failure to decide
Higgenbottombased on a specific constitutional provision leaves the door open
for the South Carolina Supreme Court to resolve this ambiguity.
III. HISTORY
A. Modern Philosophy ofSentencing CriminalDefendants
Despite ample guidance from other courts that have considered the issue
of vindictiveness, the decision inHiggenbottomfails to adhere to the reasoning
of prior decisions. According to the modem philosophy governing the
sentencing of criminals, the punishment should fit the offender and not merely
the crime.32 As a result, the trial judge has broad discretion in imposing a
sentence.33 Many states have statutes that allow more severe sentences for
subsequent crimes based on past crimeS, 34 and many states have statutes that
"nothing ... about the tone and tenor of the trial court's remarks during those proceedings
suggests it would have been futile for counsel to have raised the issue now argued to us." Id. at
651, 525 S.E.2d at 257 (Goolsby, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 650, 525 S.E.2d at 256.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. S.C. CONST. art. 1,§ 3.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 641-49, 525 S.E.2d at 252-56.
30. Id. at 650, 525 S.E.2d at 256 (Goolsby, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 652 n.1, 656-57, 525 S.E.2d at 257 n.1, 260 (Connor, J., dissenting).
32. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN
W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(c), at 28 (2d ed. 1986).
33. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559,563 (1984).
34. 3 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTrrTunONAL RIGHTS OFTHE ACCUSED § 23:43 (2d ed.); see e.g.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (mandating increased sentence for repeat
offenders).
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allow more severe sentences when aggravating circumstances are involved.35
The courts have upheld statutes of this type when challenged as a violation of
due process."
In setting the sentence, the trial judge may consider a number of factors
such as the defendant's "past life, health, habits, conduct, andmental andmoral
propensities."37 The importance the Court places on the availability of
information that the sentencing authority may rely upon is summed up as
follows: "Highly relevant-if not essential-to [the] selection of an appropriate
sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics."3 The trial judge may even consider
evidence that was not admitted during the trial.39
Although the discretion of the trial judge determines the sentence in most
cases, there are limits to the trial judge's authority. The Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit punishing a criminal
defendant for choosing to exercise constitutional or statutory rights to postconviction relief.' It is well-established that a more severe sentence imposed
solely to punish a defendant for exercising the right to appeal, to withdraw a
guilty plea, or to seek other post-conviction relief is the result of vindictiveness
and is unconstitutional.4 The problem lies in distinguishing between
"governmental action that is... a legitimate response to perceived criminal
conduct [and] governmental action that is an impermissible response to
noncriminal, [constitutionally] protected activity."'42
B. The Presumption of Vindictiveness: North Carolina v. Pearce
The Supreme Court's first attempt to resolve the constitutionality of a
4 3 which resulted in the
higher sentence at retrial was North Carolinav. Pearce,
often cited Pearcepresumption of vindictiveness. In Pearce,several years
after being convicted, the defendant initiated state post-convictionproceedings,

35. COOK,supranote 34, § 23:43; see e.g. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976
& Supp. 1999) (setting forth aggravating and mitigating circumstances that shall influence the
punishment for murder); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-65 (West Supp. 1999) (creating a statutory
offense of criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature).
36. COOK,supranote 34, § 23:43.
37. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,245 (1949).
38. Id. at 247 (citations omitted).
39. See id.at 242, 244-45 (allowing sentencing judge to base determination of sentence on
information obtained through pre-sentence investigation and probation records in addition to
evidence produced at trial).
40. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,725 (1969). The Constitution does not require
states to provide appellate review. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). However, when a
state creates a statutory right to appeal, the state cannot restrict access to appellate review.
Pearce,395 U.S. at 724 (citations omitted).
41. See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798 (1989); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
42. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 (1982)
43. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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and his conviction was reversed on constitutional grounds." The defendant was
then retried, convicted, and sentenced to eight years which, when added to the
time he had already served, amounted to a sentence longer than the initial one."
The Court held that when a more severe sentence is imposed upon a defendant
on retrial, there is a presumption of vindictiveness. 46 To overcome the
presumption, the reasons for the more severe sentence must be based on
objective information about the defendant's conduct that occurred after the
original sentence, and such facts must be stated in the record.47
The PearceCourt used the word 'vindictiveness' to describe the improper
motivation for increased sentences.4 The words 'retaliation' and 'retaliatory'
are also used to describe the conduct the Court was attempting to prevent.49 The
Court devised the Pearcepresumption in an effort to assure that retaliation was
not a factor in sentencing a criminal defendant.50 This presumption, however,
does not preclude the trial judge from subsequently imposing a harsher
sentence.-" To overcome the presumption the trial judge merely must set forth
in the record the facts which justify the higher sentence. 2
C. Circumstancesin Which the Pearce PresumptionDoes Not Apply
In theory, Pearce is a broad, sweeping rule. However, subsequent
decisions have narrowed Pearceby limiting and defining the circumstances in
which the presumption applies.5 3 The presumption of vindictiveness does not
arise where the initial sentence and the second sentence are imposed by two
differentjudges 4 where one sentence is imposed by ajury and the subsequent
sentence is imposed by a judge,5 5 or where there is a trial de novo.5 6 The

44. Id. at 713.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 726.
Id.
Id. at 725.

49. State v. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. 652 n.1, 525 S.E.2d at 257 n.1 (Ct. App. 1999)
(Connor, J., dissenting) (indicating that "retaliation" is more accurate).
50. Pearce,395 U.S. at 726.

51. See id.
52. Id. The Court has referred to this requirement as a prophylactic measure. Texas v.
McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 142 (1986) (citing Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47,52-53 (1973)).
53. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (stating that the Pearcepresumption has
been limited because it may arise where there is in fact no impropermotive thereby blocking 'a
legitimate response to criminal conduct'(quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,373

(1982))).
54. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972) ("It may often be that the superior
court will impose a punishment more severe than that received from the inferior court. But it no
more follows that such a sentence is a vindictive penalty for seeking a superior court trial than
that the inferior court imposed a lenient penalty."); State v. Hilton, 291 S.C. 276, 278-79, 353
S.E.2d 282, 284 (1987).
55. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986).
56. Colten, 407 U.S. at 119.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/6
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presumption also does not apply when a defendant withdraws a guilty plea and
receives a harsher sentence after being convicted at a full trial.5 7
1. No Presumption of Vindictiveness ifVindictiveness Clearly Not
Present
Obviously the presumption does not apply when the record clearly reflects
a lack of vindictiveness. In Texas v. McCullough the Supreme Court revisited
the issue of whether a higher sentence at retrial violates due process.58 In his
first trial, the defendant was convicted of murder and was sentenced to twenty
years by the jury. 9 The trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a new
trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. 60 At the new trial, the prosecution
presented new testimony identifying McCullough instead ofhis accomplice as
having slashed the victim's throat.6s The same judge presided, and the
defendant requested that the judge impose his sentence.62 The judge sentenced
the defendant to fifty years imprisonment.63
The Supreme Court held that the presumption of vindictiveness was
inapplicable." In support of that holding, the Court emphasized that the trial
judge granted the new trial because she herself thought that the defendant's
claims had merit.6 Furthernore, the defendantchose thejudge, rather than the
jury, to impose his sentence. 6 The Court found that these factors proved that
the circumstances did not create any apprehension on the part of the defendant
that the judge would be vindictive.67 The Court further held that the
presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because different sentencing
authorities imposed the two sentences McCullough received. 6 The Court
indicated that "[i]n such circumstances, a sentence 'increase' cannot truly be
said to have taken place. 69
2. No Presumption of Vindictiveness When Different Sentencing
AuthoritiesImpose the Sentences

57. Smith, 490 U.S. at 801.
58. 475 U.S. at 135 (1986).
59. Id. at 135-36.
60. Id. at 136.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 138.
65. Id. at 138-39.
66. Id.
67. Id. Interestingly, the majority opinion in McCullough did not mention that the
prosecutor agreed to the defense motion for a retrial. The press reported that "one of the
biggest factors influencing [the prosecutor's] decision to join the defense motion was the
possibility of... getting a harsher sentence in a new trial." Id. at 146-47 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
68. Id. at 140.
69. Id.
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Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in McCullough, the South
Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Hilton7' held that the Pearcepresumption
of vindictiveness is not applicable when the second sentencing judge is
someone other than the original trial judge who imposed the initial sentence.7
In Hilton, the defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in prison.72 His
conviction was overturned, and, at the second trial, the defendant was again
convicted and sentenced by a different judge to twenty years in prison.73 The
court reasoned that "[w]hen the second sentencing authority has no' 7prior
4
connection with the case, there can be no potential for self-vindication.
3. No Presumptionof Vindictiveness When the ExtendedSentence is
Basedon AdditionalInformationNotRevealed Priorto theInitial
Sentence
The Supreme Court held in Alabama v. Smith7 5 that the Pearce
presumption does not apply when a higher sentence is imposed after trial than
was imposed after a guilty plea.76 In Smith, after initially pleading guilty, the
defendant later had his guilty plea vacated and stood trial for burglary, rape,
and sodomy.77 Eventually, he received a longer sentence for the burglary
charge than he had received after pleading guilty.78 The Court reasoned that "in
the course of the proof at trial the judge may gather a fuller appreciation of the
nature and extent of the crimes charged," and the trial judge may also consider
the defendant's conduct during the trial when imposing a sentence. 79 In
particular, "[tihe defendant's conduct during trial may give the judge insights
into his moral character and suitability for rehabilitation."8 °
4. Other Applications of the Pearce Presumption
The Supreme Court also has applied the Pearce presumption of
vindictiveness to address prosecutors' conduct. Although prosecutorial
conduct was not an issue in Higgenbottom, these cases are important in
understanding how the Pearcepresumption has developed over time.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
Ct. App.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

291 S.C. 276, 353 S.E.2d 282 (1987).
Id. at 278-79, 353 S.E.2d at 284.
Id. at 277, 353 S.E.2d at 283.
Id.
Id. at 278-79, 353 S.E.2d at 284 (citing Williams v. State, 494 N.E.2d 1001, 1005 (Ind.
1986)).
490 U.S. 794 (1989).
Id. at 801.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at 801.
Id.
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In UnitedStates v. Goodwin,8 apolice officer filed misdemeanor andpetty
offense charges against the defendant.' The case was assigned to an attorney
from the Department of Justice who had authority to try only petty crime and
misdemeanor cases.83 The defendant entered into plea negotiations with the
prosecutor but decided not to plead guilty and requested ajury trial." The case
was then transferred to the District Court and reassigned to a different
prosecutor." After reviewing the case, the prosecutor decided to charge the
defendant with a felony rather than simply charging him with petty crime and
misdemeanor violations. 86 The defendant appealed, alleging that, due to
prosecutorial vindictiveness, he was charged with a more serious crime after
he had declined to plead guilty and had requested a jury trial.8
The Court of Appeals found that the prosecutor did not act with actual
vindictiveness but reversedbecause the circumstances warranted apresumption
of vindictiveness.88 The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals'
application of the presumption. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
possibility that a prosecutor would respond to a... demand for a jury trial by
bringing charges not in the public interest that could be explained only as a
penalty imposed on the defendant is so unlikely that a presumption of
vindictiveness certainly is not warranted."'9
Almost ten years later, the Fourth Circuit concluded that when a prosecutor
simply follows procedures that are incidental to his duties, there is no
presumption that the prosecutor's actions are vindictive. In United States v.
Mabry,9 the defendant exercised her right to challenge the presentencing
report.' After the government offered evidence of even greater cocaine
possession than was introduced at the trial, the defendant claimed that it was
because she exercised this right.93 The court held that the Pearcepresumption
of vindictiveness did not apply inthis situation because there was no reasonable
likelihood of vindictiveness where the government was "merely following the
procedures set out in the Sentencing Guidelines."'94

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

457 U.S. 368 (1982).
Id. at 370.
Id. at 370-71.
Id. at 371.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 384.
Id.
953 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 132.

93. Id.
94. Id.at 133 (citing the limitations imposed on Pearceby Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794
(1989)).
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Five years later, the South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed
prosecutorial vindictiveness in State v. Fletcher." Fletcher was convicted of
assault and battery and discharging a firearm, both of which were municipal
court offenses.96 After the reversal of her conviction on the municipal court
charges and prior to her new trial, Fletcher requested that the charge for
pointing a firearm, a general sessions charge, be dismissed because of
prosecutorial vindictiveness.' The court refused to dismiss the charge, and
Fletcher was convicted. 98 Because the solicitor charged Fletcher with the
general sessions charge at the same time that he charged her with the municipal
charges, the court held that the presumption of vindictiveness was not
warranted. 9' The general sessions charge was not brought against Fletcher after
she exercised a right to appeal; the solicitor was merely continuing to prosecute
an existing charge."° The court noted that there was no incentive for the
prosecutor to discourage an appeal because the initiation of an appeal did not
increase the prosecutor's work load since "[he was] already faced with the duty
of prosecuting [a] separate charge" resulting from the same incident.'
D. Circumstancesin Which CourtsHave Applied the Presumption
Despite the subsequent limitations to the Pearce presumption of
vindictiveness, the presumption still has valid applications. In Wasman v.
UnitedStates, "2 the Supreme Court considered whether a more severe sentence
following a successful appeal violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.'0 3 Before the defendant's second sentencing, the trial judge
considered the defendant's intervening conviction for conduct that occurred
prior to his first sentencing.!" The same judge imposed both sentences." The
Court held that these circumstances gave rise to a presumption of
vindictiveness." 6 However, the trial judge had carefully set out his reasons for
imposing a more severe sentence at the retrial:
When I imposed sentence the first time, the only conviction
on [petitioner's] record in this Court's eyes, this Court's
consideration, was failure to file income tax returns, nothing
else. I did not consider then and I don't in other cases either,

95. 322 S.C. 256,471 S.E.2d 702 (Ct. App. 1996).
96. Id. at 259, 471 S.E.2d 704.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 261, 471 S.E.2d 705.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 262, 471 S.E.2d 705.
102. 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
103. Id. at 560.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 569.
106. Id.
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pending matters because that would result in a pyramiding of
sentences. At this time he comes before me with two
convictions. Last time, he came before me with one
conviction. '
The Court concluded that considering a conviction that occurred during the
time between the initial sentencing and the resentencing was "manifestly
legitimate," thus rebutting the presumption of vindictiveness." 8
0 9
State v. Hidalgo"
raised the issue of whether, after an attempted
withdrawal of a guilty plea and a motion to reconsider sentence, imposing a
more severe sentence constitutes a due process violation.' After his guilty
plea, the defendant was originally sentenced to ten years of hard labor, but was
only required to serve thirty months ofthe sentence because the remaining time
was suspended."' The defendant later filed a motion "to set aside his guilty
plea and have his sentence reconsidered.".. The trial judge denied the motion
to set aside the guilty plea and extended the defendant's sentence to thirty-six
months rather than the thirty months he originally received." 3 The Louisiana
Court of Appeals held that the trial judge did not overcome the Pearce
presumption because the judge did not indicate in the record any adequate
justification for an extended sentence." '4 Furthermore, from the trial judge's
language it appeared that the sentence was extended simply because 5the
defendant exercised his right to attempt to have his guilty plea set aside."
In support of a presumption of vindictiveness the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that actual vindictiveness would be difficult to prove and would
require the courts to probe actual motive." 6 The presumption still arises when
there is a reasonable likelihood that the court based the extended sentence on
actual vindictiveness."' The Supreme Court's decisions regarding the issue of
vindictiveness in resentencing "reflect a recognition by the Court of the
institutional bias inherent in 'the8 judicial system against the retrial of issues that
have already been decided." "
When a higher sentence is imposed based solely upon vindictiveness, the
defendant who receives the higher sentence is not the only person harmed.

107. Id.
108. Id. at 569-70.

109. 684 So.2d 26 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
110. Id. at 28, 30.
111. Id. at28.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at31.
115. Id. For the exact language used by the judge, see infra text accompanying n. 161.
116. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372-73 (1982).
117. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794,799 (1989) (citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373); State
v. Fletcher, 322 S.C. 256, 261,471 S.E.2d 702, 704-05 (CL App. 1996).
118. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 376. The doctrines of stare decisis, resjudicata, law of the case,
and double jeopardy are examples of this institutional bias. Id.
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Those defendants who choose not to exercise their rights for fear of retaliation
are also harmed." 9 The presumption of vindictiveness is designed to free the
criminal defendant from the apprehension that she might receive a harsher
sentence if she exercises constitutional or statutorily created rights.2 The
presumption applies when there is no explicit evidence of bad faith or
retaliationand when it appears that the sentencing authority may have a
considerable stake in the outcome of the case." After Pearce,the Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he rationale of [the] judgment in the Pearcecase... was
not grounded upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motivation must
inevitably exist," but that due process requires that the defendant not be
unconstitutionally deterred by a fear of such retaliation.'"
IV ANALYSIS

A. Presumption of Vindictiveness
The trial judge in Higgenbottom who extended his sentence in response to
Higgenbottom's motion to reconsider was the same trial judge who imposed
the initial sentence. 4 The day after Higgenbottom entered this plea and
received his sentence, his attorney appeared before the same trial judge on a
motion to reconsider the probation, specifically requesting a reduction of
probation to twelve months."2 Based on prior decisions of the Supreme Court
and the South Carolina Court of Appeals, the South Carolina Supreme Court
in this case should have found a presumption of vindictiveness, particularly
because the same judge imposed both sentences.' 26

119. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,24-25 (1973).
120. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
121. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974).
122. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27. Extending the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness to
prosecutorial vindictiveness, the Court in Blackledge based its decision on the likelihood that a
prosecutor might have a "considerable stake in discouraging convicted misdemeanants from
appealing ..... Id.

123. Id. at 28. The Court in Blackledge found that where a prison inmate was convicted on
a misdemeanor charge and appealed that conviction resulting in a trial de novo in North
Carolina's two-tiered appellate system, the prosecutor could not then charge the defendant with
a felony stemming from the same incident on which the prior misdemeanor conviction was
based. Id. at 28-29. The facts in Blackledge differed from the facts in People v. Williams, where
the court found that it was constitutional for the prosecutor to charge the defendant with a more
serious crime at the second trial because the information the prosecutor needed to support a
higher charge was unavailable to the prosecutor at the time ofthe initial trial. People v. Williams,
916 P.2d 624, 627 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
124. State v. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. 637, 639, 525 S.E.2d 250, 251 (Ct. App. 1999).
125. Id. at 639-40, 525 S.E.2d at 251.
126. See Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559,569 (1984); see also State v. Hilton, 291
S.C. 276, 278-79, 353 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1987) (holding the presumption inapplicable when the
resentencing judge and trial judge are different).
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The Court in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe'27 emphasized the fact that the initial
sentencing authority may have a personal stake in the outcome of the case.'28
Applying the presumption of vindictiveness to a case in which the same judge
imposes both the initial and second sentence is logical because a retaliatory
motive is greater when a judge is forced to rehear a matter that the judge
believes to have been previously settled. The same rationale underlies the
Chaffin Court's holding that the presumption does not arise where the jury
imposes the second sentence.'29 The Court reasoned that thejury: (1) typically
is unaware of the prior sentence; (2) has no personal stake in the prior
conviction nor motivation to engage in self-vindication (unlike ajudge who has
been reversed); and (3) is not as likely to be sensitive to the institutional
30
interests giving judges incentives to discourage "meritless" appeals.
In finding no presumption of vindictiveness in Higgenbottom, Judge
Anderson distinguished between a trial judge who imposes a harsher sentence
in response to a motion to reconsider and a trial judge who imposes a harsher
sentence when the initial sentence has been reversed.' 3 ' Judge Anderson
concluded that a trial judge who has been reversed has a motive to vindicate
himself by punishing the defendant with a more severe sentence, but the trial
judge in Higgenbottom had no such motive. 32 This distinction purports to
consider the rationale supporting the presumption ofvindictiveness. However,
by attempting to distinguish scenarios in which a judge would have a motive
for vindication, Judge Anderson essentially minimized the reality that a variety
of circumstances might lead to retaliatory or vindictive actions on the part of
the judge.
The rationale behind the Pearcepresumption is that a judge may feel the
need to retaliate against the defendant for exercising the right to make post-trial
motions or the right to appeal.' 33 A post-trial collateral attack and an appeal are
both efforts to alter the sentence the defendant has received. It is illogical to
suggest that ajudge would retaliate when the defendant attacks the sentence or
conviction in a higher court but not when the defendant attempts to attack the
sentence in the same court where he initially received the sentence. Admittedly,
a retaliatory motive is more likely to exist when ajudge is forced to sit through
a retrial ordered by an appellate court, which he may consider a waste of time.
However, even without a retrial, the judge still must use his valuable time to
hear and rule on a motion to reconsider.

127. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
128. See id. at 27.

129. Id.
130. Id. at 26-27; see also United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 n.5 (1982)

(paraphrasing Chaffin's rationale).
131. Higgenbottom,337 S.C. at 649, 525 S.E.2d at 256; cf Williams v. State, 494 N.E.2d
1001, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a trial judge who overturned a conviction for
prosecutorial misconduct cannot have a motivation for self-vindication).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 24-25.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2000

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Vol. 51: 759

An even stronger argument for the existence of a retaliatory motive in
circumstances such as Higgenbottom is that the defendant is not only
disagreeing with the judge, but is essentially arguing that the judge erred in his
initial determination. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that a
presumption of vindictiveness should not apply solely because a defendant
seeks an acquittal,' other factors warrant the presumption in Higgenbottom.
The trial judge in Higgenbottom not only failed to indicate any factual
basis for extending Higgenbottom's sentence, but he also failed, through his
conduct, to give any grounds for believing that he was not acting vindictively.
In contrast, the trial judge in McCullough granted the defendant's motion for
a new trial, was chosen by the defendant to impose his sentence, and explained
in the record that the higher sentence was due to new evidence presented at the
subsequent trial.' 35 Based on these factors, the Court did not find that the
circumstances warranted a presumption of vindictiveness.' 36 The trial judge's
statements to Higgenbottom's counsel implicitly indicate that his only basis for
extending the sentence was that Higgenbottom made the motion to reconsider
his sentence. 3 7 The record in Higgenbottom lacks any evidence similar to the
evidence in McCullough that would rebut the appearance that the trial judge
was acting vindictively.
The rationale for requiring that the supporting facts be included in the
record is to ensure that the constitutionality of the increased sentence may be
fully reviewed on appeal.' The reason for the higher sentence "must be based
upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the
39
defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."'
Additionally, evidence beyond the defendant's conduct subsequent to the initial
sentencing may be considered.'4"
In McCullough the Court held that when the Pearcepresumption applies,
the harsher sentence may be justified by facts which occurred prior to the first
14
trial but were unknown to the sentencing authority at the first sentencing. '
Additionally, an increased sentence may be justified by relevant conduct or

134. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 139 (1986).
135. Id. at 136, 138-39. In particular, the trial judge stated that the sentence which the
defendant "received initially was unduly lenient in light of significant evidence not before the
sentencing jury in the first trial." Id. at 140.
136. Id. at 138-39.
137. Higgenbottom,337 S.C. at 640, 525 S.E.2d at 251 (quoting the trial judge: "since he
is asking for a reconsideration maybe I ought to just reconsider it on my own and extend his
sentence"); see infra Part IV.B.
138. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969).
139. Id.
140. See McCullough, 475 U.S. at 141; Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 571-72
(1984).
141. See McCullough, 475 U.S. at 144. Similarly, a prosecutor is not acting vindictively
when he brings additional charges after reversal of the previous conviction when the facts
supporting the additional charges were not available to the prosecutor at the time of the initial
trial. People v. Williams, 916 P.2d 624, 627 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
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events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing.

42

If a lesser

sentence was imposed initially and the resentencing authority may not consider
any evidence obtained after the initial sentence, the defendant has essentially

received less punishment than deserved.
These decisions are consistent with
43
the modem sentencing philosophy. 1
The trial judge in Higgenbottom was not presented with any additional
facts beyond those facts he had the previous day when he imposed the initial
sentence. 144 The trial judge did not explain why a harsher sentence was
warranted. Thus, this case differs from a situation in which a defendant enters
a guilty plea, receives a sentence, and later receives a harsher sentence after a
full trial.145 A sentence imposed after a trial is based on much more information
than a sentence resulting from a guilty plea. As Judge Connor said in dissent,
"One day after the original sentencing, the only thing that was different about
Higgenbottom's case was his motion to reconsider."' 46
The Supreme Court has indicated that the Pearce presumption is a
"prophylactic rule [that] must be given a common sense interpretation
consistent with the function of that rule."' 47 A reconsideration by the same
judge ofthe very same facts available to him at the initial sentencing warrants,
at the very least, a presumption of vindictiveness when a harsher sentence is
imposed. The trial judge could have given Higgenbottom the harsher sentence
at the initial sentencing without encountering a constitutional dilemma.
However, because the extended sentence was imposed after Higgenbottom
exercised his right to make a motion to reconsider, an entirely plausible
explanation for the increase in the sentence is that it was imposed in retaliation
against Higgenbottom for exercising his rights. The circumstances indicate a

142. Wasman, 468 U.S. at 572. The Court reasoned that there is no logical support for
distinguishing between 'events' and 'conduct' occurring after the initial sentence in light of the
fact that the modem philosophy of sentencing is to consider any information that sheds light on
every aspect of the defendant's life. Id. at 571-72. The events and conduct need not negatively
affect the defendant. For example, in a Wisconsin case, defense counsel attempted to introduce
evidence at the resentencing hearing pertaining to defendant's good conduct since the first
sentencing, his offer of employment upon release from prison, and a dismissal of a previously
pending charge against the defendant. State v. Carter, 560 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Wis. 1997). The
court, holding that the trial court should consider all relevant information, stated that the court's
role in determining an initial sentence and a resentence is the same-the sentencing and
resentencing courts should have "accurate, complete and current information." Id. at 262.
143. See supra Part IIM.A.
144. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 654, 525 S.E.2d at 258 (Connor, J., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). The dissenting opinion in
Higgenbottom specifically points out that "[n]one ofthe things the Court considered in Smith in
determining there was no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness were present [in this case]."
Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 654, 525 S.E.2d at 258 (Connor, J., dissenting). The trial judge in
Higgenbottomhad no new evidence before him on the day ofthemotion to reconsider; therefore,
he did not 'gather a fuller appreciation of the nature and extent of the crimes charged."' Id.
(quoting Smith, 490 U.S. at 801).
146. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 654, 525 S.E.2d at 259 (Connor, J., dissenting).
147. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.1 (C) (1985).
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reasonable likelihood that the trial judge was acting with vindictiveness in
extending Higgenbottom's sentence.
B. Actual Vindictiveness
Judge Anderson concluded that there was no actual vindictiveness when
the trial judge extended Higgenbottom's sentence. 4 ' When the circumstances
do not warrant a presumption of vindictiveness, the defendant has the burden
of proving actual vindictiveness. 149 InPeoplev. Williams5 the court addressed
the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness. The defendant successfully attacked
his conviction, and, at the second trial, the district attorney added additional
charges against the defendant as a habitual offender.' Information regarding
an out-of-state conviction was not available on the National Crime Information
Computer, so the prosecutor did not have that information available to him in
time to add such charges at the initial trial.'52 The court concluded that because
the prosecutor did not know of, and could not have known of, the facts that
were the basis for the additional charge, there was no actual vindictiveness in
53
seeking a conviction on habitual criminal charges.
Likewise, inMcCulloughthe Court held there was no actual vindictiveness
when the trial judge thoroughly explained her reasons for imposing a sentence
that was higher than the initial sentence imposed by the jury. 54 At the second
trial, the judge relied on the testimony of two new witnesses to set the
defendant's sentence. 5 The Court found that the judge's more severe second
sentence156was based on an "on-the-record, wholly logical, nonvindictive
reason."'
The burden of proving actual vindictiveness is difficult to carry.'57 To
prove actual vindictiveness, the defendant must show some action on the
judge's part that indicates he was acting out of vindictiveness. In Hidalgo,
where the court found actual vindictiveness, the court based its decision on the
words spoken by the trial judge. 5 After he was sentenced, Hidalgo made a

148. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 649, 525 S.E.2d at 256.
149. See United States v. Wasman, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984); State v. Fletcher, 322 S.C.
256, 261,471 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Ct. App. 1996).
150. 916 P.2d 624 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
151. Id. at 626.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 626-27.
154. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986); see supra notes 134-35 and
accompanying text. In McCullough, the same factors that led the Court to conclude that a
presumption of vindictiveness was not warranted are the same factors the Court considered to
conclude there was no actual vindictiveness. Id. at 141-42.
155. McCullough, 475 U.S. at 136.
156. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).

157. See supra Parts

mI.C., ]II.D.

158. State v. Hidalgo, 684 So.2d 26, 31 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
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motion to set aside his guilty plea and have his sentence reconsidered. 59 The
trial judge denied the motion to set aside the guilty plea and ruled on the
motion to reconsider. 6 The judge stated:
Instead of taking his medicine, admitting his guilt, and
accepting his sentence, he chose instead to attack his plea
when he knew it was free and voluntary. And in thinking
about it, I think I was too easy on him the first time around.
So I am going to reconsider his sentence, and I am going to
amend it by increasing his hard labor time to 36 months
rather than 30 months, which is in accordance with the presentence investigation."6
The circumstances in Higgenbottom are remarkably similar to those in
Hidalgo.When defense counsel made the motion to reconsider, the trial judge
stated, "'Hejust about talked himself into jail as it was. No, sir; I'm going to
give him twenty-four months probation. We're going to see ifhe can do
probation ....Since you made the motion to reconsider, I'm denying that
motion and I'm reconsidering
my sentence and extending his probation to
' 162
twenty-four months."
Judge Anderson found that Higgenbottom did not meet his burden of
proving actual vindictiveness. 163 Rationalizing his decision, Judge Anderson
stated that the trial judge based his decision to extend Higgenbottom's sentence
on a review of the facts of the case.' 6 Judge Anderson further explain that the
trial judge did not believe Higgenbottom's explanation of why there was a
spoon in his pocket with traces ofcocaine. 65 However, Judge Anderson did not
point to anything in the record that indicated that the trial judge considered any
new facts when he ruled on the motion to reconsider. The only indication in the
judge's words that might have led Judge Anderson to conclude that the
extended sentence was based on a review of the facts is the trial judge's
Maybe he'll be
statement, "He just about talked himself into jail as it was ....
cleaning up his lot again." 1
Assuming the trial judge did increase Higgenbottom's sentence based on
a review of the facts that he had at the time of the original sentencing, the result
in Higgenbottom would remain problematic. As the dissent points out,
"[a]llowing an increased sentence based on a reconsideration of the same

159. Id. at 28.
160. Id. at31.
161. Id.
162. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 640, 525 S.E.2d at 251 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 649, 525 S.E.2d at 256.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 649-50, 525 S.E.2d at 256.
166. Id. at 640, 525 S.E.2d at 251 (referring sarcastically to defendant's excuse that he
found the cocaine-tinged spoon while cleaning up the parking lot of his tire store).
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evidence would effectively eliminate the protection the United States Supreme
Court attempted to provide in Pearce."'67 Moreover, the cases that the South
Carolina Court of Appeals considered inHiggenbottom,with the exception of
Hidalgo,involved factual or procedural circumstances that differed from the
circumstances in Higgenbottom 6 8 In those cases, there were factors that the
courts emphasized in concluding that the presumption of vindictiveness did not
apply or that there was no actual vindictiveness.
Furthermore, Judge Anderson's decision on the issue of error preservation
supports the contention that at least a presumption of vindictiveness was
warranted, if not a finding of actual vindictiveness. Judge Anderson based the
decision regarding the preservation of issues in the trial court on the rule of
futility. 169 The rule of futility excuses an appellant's failure to make an
objection in the trial court on the basis that such an objection would have been
futile. 70 Judge Anderson inferred that the tone and tenor of the trial judge were
such that an objection would have been futile. 7 ' Apparently Judge Anderson,
reviewing the exchange between defense counsel and the trial judge regarding
the motion to reconsider, interpreted the judge's words to indicate that any
further objection by defense counsel would have been harassment or would
have been met by a response adverse to the defendant. 72

167. Id. at 655, 525 S.E.2d at 259 (Connor, J., dissenting).
168. See id.
169. Id. at 640, 525 S.E.2d at 251.
170. Id. (citing State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71, 447 S.E.2d 186 (1994)). In explaining the
impropriety of a question defense counsel asked a witness, the judge made the following
statements to the jury:
I hate to fuss at a pretty girl .... But it was a kind of below the
belt shot [sic]. But she was doing the best, she thought. But
anyhow as she gains experience [sic] .... It was a shot in the
dark which implies wrongdoing .... So don't hold it against
her, she's a nice girl I was young once myself, I put it to plain
inexperience or whatever, but you'll get over it as you learn
[sic].
Pace, 316 S.C. at 73, 447 S.E.2d at 187. The supreme court held that the tone and tenor of the
trial judge's remarks indicated that any objection defense counsel could have made would have
been futile. Id. at 74, 525 S.E.2d at 187.
171. Higgenbottom,337 S.C. at 640,525 S.E.2d at 251. The concurring opinion noted that
the exchange between defense counsel and the trial judge indicated that counsel was well aware
of the trial judge's authority and the possibility of an extended sentence and, in fact, conceded
that the trial judge had the power to do what he did. Id. at 650-51, 525 S.E.2d at 256-57
(Goolsby, J., concurring). Even if Judge Goolsby's interpretation of defense counsel's words is
correct, it is still constitutionally impermissible for a trial judge to extend a defendant's sentence
based on vindictiveness. Defense counsel's acknowledgment that vindictiveness may result in
some judges imposing increased sentences does not obviate the need to examine the
constitutionality of the increased sentence.
172. Id. at 640, 525 S.E.2d at 251. Judge Anderson stated, "Higgenbottom objected to his
original sentence and received a higher sentence on resentencing. If Higgenbottom objected to
his sentence in this resentencing scenario, surely he would place himself in a perilous posture."
Id. The use of "perilous" suggests that Judge Anderson thought that any objection by defense
counsel to the extension ofthe sentence would have resulted in Higgenbottom receiving an even
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While concluding Higgenbottom's failure to object was excused, Judge
Anderson referred to the dilemma of a defense attorney, hypothesizing that an
objection by a defense attorney may result in harassing a judge who has ruled
on an issue by presenting the issue to him again.173 The very fact that Judge
Anderson made this observation seems to indicate that his decision on the issue
of vindictiveness was ill-reasoned. Judge Anderson's reasoning on this issue
is similar to the reasoning that led to the application of the Pearcepresumption
in certain situations. The policy behind the presumption is to assure that
vindictiveness plays no part in the resentencing process. 74 By excusing the
defendant's failure to object below because the judge may have imposed an
even harsher sentence, Judge Anderson implies that such an increased sentence
surely would have been due to vindictiveness.
C. ChillingEffect
Not only does the Higgenbottom decision violate Higgenbottom's right to
due process, but it also could have devastating effects on the basic principles
embodied in the appellate process. A criminal defendant's fear of an extended
sentence could deter the defendant from exercising a statutory or constitutional
right to appeal. The following is a letter written by an inmate to a judge
regarding the possibility of a retrial:
"Dear Sir:
I am in the Mecklenburg County jail. Mr.

_

chose to re-try me as

I knew he would....
Sir the other defendant in this case was set free after serving 15
months of his sentence, I have served 34 months and now I am to be
tried again and with all probility I will receive a heavier sentence then
before as you know sir my sentence at the first trile was 20 to 30
years. I know it is usuelly the courts prosedure to give a larger
sentence when a new trile is granted I guess this is to discourage
Petitioners.
Your Honor, I don't want a new trile I am afraid of more time....
Your Honor, I know you have tried to help me and God knows I
apreceate this but please sir don't let the state retry me if there is any
it.
way you can prevent
175
Very truly yours"'

harsher sentence.
173. Id. Provided the judge has occasion to consider an issue, it is .'not incumbent upon
defense counsel to harass the judge by parading the issue before him again."' State v.
McDaniel, 320 S.C. 33, 37,462 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Dunn v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 311 S.C. 43,46,426 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1993)).
174. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,725 (1969).
175. Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 639 n.7 (4th Cir. 1967) (alteration and errors

in original).
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This letter indicates that there may indeed be a chilling effect when a defendant
fears that resentencing routinely results in a harsher sentence.
However, not all such effects are problematic; the Court clearly
distinguished between permissible and impermissible chilling effects:
[A] defendant may be more reluctant to appeal if there is a
risk that new, probative evidence supporting a longer
sentence may be revealed on retrial. But this Court has never
recognized this "chilling effect" as sufficient reason to create
a constitutional prohibition against considering relevant
information in assessing sentences.' 76
The Court has expressed "no doubt about the constitutional validity of higher
sentences in the absence of vindictiveness despite
whatever incidental deterrent
177
effect they might have on the right to appeal."'
The circumstances inHiggenbottomappear to fall under the impermissible
category. No new, probative evidence was produced at the motion to
reconsider to support the harsher sentence imposed by the trial judge. Rather,
Judge Anderson seemed to construe the trial judge's words to find that the
extended sentence was based on consideration of the facts, but no new facts
were presented.'78 A resentencing based on areview of the same facts that were
known and considered at the initial sentence is no different from a review
without new, probative evidence. Such a holding will chill a criminal
defendant's choice ofpursuing statutory or constitutional rights after conviction
and sentencing. A defendant who feared a severe sentence, but received a
lesser one, will be reluctant to appeal his conviction, even when an appeal is
justified, for fear of a harsher sentence based on the exact same evidence.
V. CONCLUSION

From Pearceto the present, courts considering the issue of vindictiveness
in sentencing have been concerned that, even without an actual interference
with a defendant's right to exercise constitutional or statutory rights, there must
be no apprehension on the part of the defendant in exercising those rights. It
appears that the court in Higgenbottom did exactly what it purported not to
do-it hindered the criminal defendant's exercise of his right to appeal or to
pursue statutory remedies for fear of a longer sentence imposed by a vindictive
judge.
Ajudge should be able to impose a proper sentence at resentencing in light
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. It is in society's best

176. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 143 (1986).
177. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 29 (1973).
178. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 654-55, 525 S.E.2d at 258 (Connor, J., dissenting).
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interest that criminals be punished for their wrongdoings. 79 There should not

be an absolute ban on imposing higher sentences on resentencing. However,
there are constitutional requirements that must not be ignored when a sentence
is imposed. When the judge imposes a more severe sentence than the initial
sentence - whether imposed by the same judge, a differentjudge, or ajury - the

judge should have objective reasons constituting the basis of his decision to
impose a more severe sentence. A requirement that the judge set out those
reasons in the record is not unreasonable. 8 '
Judge Anderson states that the Pearcepresumption has been eviscerated

by subsequent cases.'

Although subsequent cases have defined, thereby

limiting, the situations in which the Pearcepresumption is applicable, Pearce
has not been overruled.' The cases subsequent to Pearcehave simply limited
Pearce according to the balance that is needed between society's interest in
punishing criminals, the trial judge's discretion in determining a proper
sentence, and a criminal's constitutional rights. 18 3 Indeed, the presumption of
vindictiveness is not one which should apply every time a defendant receives
a higher sentence, but the presumption is a legitimate method of protecting a
criminal defendant's right to appeal a conviction." s The erosion of the Pearce
rule which may result from Higgenbottom is detrimental. For defendants, it

179. "It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted
immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the
proceedings leading to conviction."North Carolinav. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,750 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466
(1964)). "[Tjhis societal interest is compromised to a degree if the second judge is forbidden to
impose a greater punishment on retrial than was meted out at the first trial." Pearce, 395 U.S.
at 750.
180. In fact, some states require that a resentencing court explain the basis for its sentence
in the record. State v. Carter, 560 N.W.2d 256, 258 n.2 (Wis. 1997).
181. Higgenbottom, 337 S.C. at 643, 525 S.E.2d at 253.
182. Some courts do cite Alabama v. Smith as having overruled Pearce.See State v. Oliver,
470 S.E.2d 16, 18 (N.C. 1996); Gorham v. Commonwealth, 426 S.E.2d 493, 495 (Va. Ct. App.
1993); State v. Gill, 416 S.E.2d 253, 258 (W.Va. 1992). These cases deal with the issue of
double jeopardy and cite Pearceas overruled on other grounds. The Court in Smith explained
that its "conclusion... [was] not consistent with Simpson v. Rice, the companion case to North
Carolina v. Pearce" because in that case the Court failed to distinguish between different
sentences imposed after two trials and different sentences imposed after a guilty plea and after
a trial. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802 (1989). The Court overruled Simpson v. Rice's
holding that there is a presumption of vindictiveness when the sentence after a trial is more
severe than the sentence after a guilty plea. Id. at 803.
183. In limiting the circumstances in which the presumption arises, the Court has stated
that "[g]iven the severity of such a presumption... which may operate in the absence of any
proof of an improper motive and thus may block a legitimate response to criminal conduct- the
Court has [applied the presumption] only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of
vindictiveness exists." United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 (1982).
184. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took the Pearcepresumption one step
further and adopted as a part of state common law the principle that, upon resentencing, the
judge may impose a harsher sentence only if the judge's reasons for imposing the harsher
sentence are included in the record and are based on information that the initial sentencing judge
did not have. Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (1995).
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may lead to a reduction in the filing of justified appeals. For society, fewer
appeals will reduce the opportunity for higher sentences that would be given
where they are actually warranted, thereby correcting sentences that initially
may have been too lenient.
The Pearcepresumption is no insurmountable obstacle and is easy for the
state to rebut if there are in fact valid reasons for the increased sentence. The
fact that the United States Supreme Court articulated a presumption indicates
that the Court thought it more desirable to provide broad protection which may
extend to situations that do not necessarily require such protection, rather than
to allow unconstitutional interference with a defendant's rights. If and when the
South Carolina Supreme Court addresses this issue, the court should consider
two factors that lessen the value of the Higgenbottom decision. First, only one
judge on the Court of Appeals wrote the opinion in Higgenbottom. Neither of
the other two judges agreed with Judge Anderson's application of the law.
Second, the Court of Appeals failed to clearly identify any constitutional
provision on which the opinions were based. 5 In the interest of protecting the
rights embodied in the United States and South Carolina constitutions, the
supreme court should take this opportunity to correct the unwise decision of
Higgenbottom and to clearly indicate the constitutional provisions which
command such a result.
Nancy Fennell

185. See supraPart II.
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